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I. INTRODUCTION 
Academic freedom, a coveted feature of higher education, is the 
concept that faculty should be free to perform their essential functions as 
professors and scholars without the threat of retaliation or undue admin-
istrative influence. The central mission of an academic institution, teach-
ing and research, is well served by academic freedom that allows the 
faculty to conduct its work in the absence of censorship or coercion. In 
support of this proposition, courts have long held that academic freedom 
is a special concern of the First Amendment, granting professors and 
faculty members cherished protections regarding academic speech. 
As early as 1957, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
1
 and as recent as 
2006 in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
2
 the Supreme Court has grappled with clari-
fying academic-freedom protections. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held 
that when public employees make statements in the course of performing 
their official duties, they are not insulated by the Constitution from em-
ployer discipline.
3
 Pursuant to Garcetti, it becomes plausible that a facul-
ty member’s expression or speech, at least at a public college or universi-
                                                          
* Oren R. Griffin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Mercer University School of Law; B.S., 
1987, Southern University at New Orleans; M.A.E., 1988, University of Northern Iowa; Ph.D., 
1994, University of Iowa; J.D., 1996, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The author is 
grateful for the support and encouragement provided by his wife, Theresa, and two wonderful sons, 
Andrew and Matthew, in the preparation of this article. Also, the author would like to thank Mr. Jim 
Walsh, Mr. John Perkins, and Ms. Denise Gibson, three great librarians at the Mercer University 
School of Law for their assistance.  
 1. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 3. Id. at 421. 
 
2 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1 
ty, would not be entitled to constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment and may be the basis for disciplinary action. The ramifica-
tions could be significant for academics who speak and write in the 
course of performing their official job duties. In the majority opinion, 
however, Justice Kennedy attempted to set aside such concerns by stat-
ing that the Garcetti holding may not forestall some constitutional pro-
tection for professorial speech.
4
 But the majority opinion only implicates 
academic scholarship and classroom instruction as perhaps deserving of 
constitutional protection. 
At the outset, this article recounts the Garcetti majority opinion and 
the accompanying opinions offered by the dissenters. Secondly, the arti-
cle explores the meaning of academic freedom for individual academics 
and faculty as expressed through various judicial decisions, including the 
post-Garcetti case law, as well as other higher education advocates. 
Next, the article delves into the complexity of academic speech and some 
intriguing contemporary examples. Finally, the article discusses the chal-
lenges confronting academic-freedom protections going forward and the 
opportunity created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti. In sum, 
this article seeks to address the current state of individual academic free-
dom at America’s colleges and universities. 
II. A VIEW OF THE GARCETTI DECISION 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, Richard Ceballos, a public employee work-
ing as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District At-
torney’s Office, became embroiled in a dispute with his supervisors re-
garding the contents of an affidavit that was used to obtain a search war-
rant critical to a criminal prosecution.
5
 Ceballos believed that the affida-
vit included various inaccuracies and misrepresentations and concluded 
that the criminal case should be dismissed after receiving an unsatisfacto-
ry explanation for the inaccuracies from the warrant affiant, a Los Ange-
les County deputy sheriff.
6
 
Further, Ceballos submitted his memo and findings to his supervi-
sors, which resulted in a heated discussion about the search warrant and 
the merits of the criminal case.
7
 Despite Ceballos’s contrary recommen-
dation, the criminal prosecution proceeded.
8
 The defense attorney for the 
accused filed a motion challenging the search warrant, and Ceballos was 
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called by the defense to testify regarding the deficiencies within the 
search warrant.
9
 Subsequently, Ceballos claimed that he was subject to a 
string of retaliatory employment actions that included an unwanted reas-
signment and transfer, as well as the denial of a promotion.
10
 Ceballos 
responded by filing a grievance and eventually suing the District Attor-
ney’s Office for violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.
11
 
The District Attorney’s Office argued that Ceballos’s memo was 
not protected speech under the First Amendment because the memo was 
written pursuant to his employment duties.
12
 The district court agreed, 
granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.13 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’s memo was protected 
speech under the First Amendment pursuant to the reasoning set out in 
Pickering v. Board of Education
14
 because the memo concerned speech 
regarding a matter of public concern, i.e., alleged government miscon-
duct.
15
 The court of appeals did not address whether the speech was 
made in Ceballos’s capacity as a private citizen or public employee.16 On 
certiorari before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority in the 5–4 decision, reversed, stating the following: “We hold 
that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.”17 
Justice Kennedy indicated that Ceballos wrote the memo because 
that was within the scope of his employment.
18
 “The fact that his duties 
sometimes required him to speak and write does not mean his supervi-
sors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.”19 Further, the 
majority observed that job-related expressions outside of a public em-
ployee’s official duties were protected by the First Amendment, such as 
informed opinions that may be offered by a teacher to a school board on 
matters related to school operations.
20
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The Court’s opinion included dissenting responses from Justices 
Stevens
21
 and Breyer,
22
 with a more extensive response from Justice 
Souter.
23
 Although briefly discussed, Justice Stevens disagreed with the 
notion that a categorical difference existed between speaking as a citizen 
and speaking in the course of one’s employment.24 Stevens found it im-
material whether a public employee’s speech was made pursuant to one’s 
job duties.
25
 Relying on the Court’s decision in Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District, wherein concerns raised by a teacher about 
a school district’s racist employment practices were entitled to First 
Amendment protection, Stevens announced that a new rule dependent on 
a job description was senseless and misguided.
26
 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion took note of the complexity that 
beset free speech concerns for public-sector employees and employers 
generally, and contended that the degree of First Amendment protection 
afforded public employees will differ based on the category of speech at 
issue.
27
 Breyer was unable to join the majority, however, because it held 
that public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties are never 
insulated from employer discipline.
28
 
Finding this position too narrow, Breyer explained that Pickering 
balancing—weighing an employee’s free speech interests against an em-
ployer’s interests in promoting efficient public service operations—
should apply to public employee speech regarding matters of public con-
cern made in the course of performing job duties.
29
 Ceballos’s position as 
a prosecutor and lawyer obligated him to share exculpatory evidence 
with defense counsel, thereby establishing a basis to protect speech of-
fered in the course of performing his job as a deputy district attorney.
30
 
Breyer indicated that pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,
31
 Ceballos’s memo-
randum was entitled to First Amendment protection, and because Ce-
ballos was acting as a lawyer, his speech was subject to examination by 
canons of the profession that obviated the need for government authority 
to control the public employee’s speech.32 
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Further, Breyer endorsed Pickering, balancing on the facts present-
ed in Garcetti, because professional and special constitutional obliga-
tions mandate protection for Ceballos’s employee speech.33 As a lawyer, 
Ceballos’s speech was subject to regulation by canons of the profes-
sion.
34
 Also, as a prosecutor, he was required by constitutional obliga-
tions to communicate with the defense regarding exculpatory evidence 
and scrutinize evidence relied upon by the government.
35
 Based on these 
circumstances, Breyer held that First Amendment protection should be 
granted to such employee speech and that Pickering balancing should be 
applied.
 36
 
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg 
joined, offered a third dissenting opinion indicating that the reach of the 
majority’s holding went too far by categorically discounting public em-
ployee speech.
37
 Agreeing that a government employer has a substantial 
interest in effectuating its policy objectives, Souter observed that em-
ployee speech is not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection.
38
 
Thus, employee speech that represents a distraction or obstacle to the 
implementation of lawful public policy may be correctly denied First 
Amendment protection.
39
 Contrary to the majority’s view, however, 
Souter argued that Pickering balancing was the proper approach to de-
termine eligibility for First Amendment protection when an employee 
speaks critically about his or her employer.
40
 
Souter took specific issue with the categorical bar to First Amend-
ment protection for statements made in the course of performing official 
job duties by stating the following: 
[T]here is no adequate justification for the majority’s line categori-
cally denying Pickering protection to any speech uttered ‘pursuant 
to . . . official duties . . . .’ As all agreed, the qualified speech pro-
tection embodied in Pickering balancing resolves the tension be-
tween individual and public interests in the speech, on the one hand, 
and the government’s interest in operating efficiently without dis-
traction or embarrassment by talkative or headline-grabbing em-
ployees.
41
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Souter, however, further explained that the feasibility of Pickering 
balancing is advanced by adjustments that would allow an employee to 
prevail only when speaking within the scope of his or her job duties on 
matters of unusual importance.
42
 
Also, Souter pointed to the majority’s flawed belief that any public 
employee speech constitutes government speech, which requires espous-
al of a particular policy or substantive position, consistent with the 
Court’s previous decisions in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Uni-
versity of Virginia and Rust v. Sullivan.
43
 Souter, here, observed that Ce-
ballos was not employed to broadcast a particular message.
44
 Certainly, 
the Los Angeles County District Attorney had an interest in what Ce-
ballos might say as a part of his job, but the speech uttered in the course 
of his job duties was not preset or prescribed as found in the Rust deci-
sion.
45
 It is this expansive notion of government speech as a means of 
controlling or restricting public employee free expression that may have 
troubling consequences for public colleges and universities.
46
 
Souter further opined that the majority’s holding in Garcetti posed 
a threat to academic freedom for public university professors who speak 
and write pursuant to their official job duties.
47
 The majority’s opinion 
found that the First Amendment does not protect speech or written ex-
pression by public employees uttered in the course of performing their 
jobs.
48
 For college and university professors at public institutions, the 
Court’s decision left open the question of whether academic freedom 
extended under the First Amendment protects faculty speech relative to 
teaching and scholarly activities, as well as assessments of administrative 
processes such as promotion, tenure, hiring, and the management of in-
stitutional resources.
49
 Moreover, Souter took no comfort in the majori-
ty’s argument that public employees may rely on state and federal whis-
tleblower statutes, rather than the First Amendment, to remedy retaliato-
ry disciplinary action unlawfully imposed by their supervisors as a con-
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sequence of job-related speech.
50
 Referring to available whistleblower 
statutes as a “patchwork” of definitions and protections, Souter argued 
that whistleblower provisions were ill-equipped to address the concerns 
that would be raised by public sector employees.
51
 
Arguably, Garcetti denies First Amendment protection to any pub-
lic employee who speaks within the scope of performing official job du-
ties. Faculty at public colleges and universities, however, enjoy academic 
freedom to express themselves on various academic and intellectual top-
ics without the threat of censorship, intimidation, or adverse employment 
retaliation. Thus, a conflict may exist as to whether Garcetti’s applica-
tion undermines academic freedom at colleges and universities. Justice 
Kennedy, perhaps in anticipating such conflict, indicated the following in 
the Garcetti majority opinion: 
There is some argument that expression related to academic schol-
arship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional 
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary 
employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do 
not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in 
the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.
52
 
Thus, for those most concerned with Garcetti’s implication for 
higher education, the Court left uncertain whether academic freedom 
remains a special concern of the First Amendment and the scope of aca-
demic-freedom protections available to faculty. Garcetti strikes a strange 
chord in light of the Court’s well-settled position that faculty must re-
main free to pursue scholarship, teach, and “to gain new maturity and 
understanding.”53 Such maturity and understanding is gained by speech 
and inquiry beyond the campus grounds without fear of reprisal or disci-
pline for commentary that administrators or governmental officials find 
objectionable. At the same time, however, academic freedom cannot be a 
passcard for mayhem. The challenge is to sustain academic freedom 
without surrendering practical administrative controls. 
Conceptually, the Garcetti dissenters appear to be correct when 
they recognize that categorically denying First Amendment protection to 
public employee speech uttered in the course of performing job duties is 
fraught with hazards. Pickering balancing, with or without adjustments, 
offers a well-reasoned, flexible method to resolve complex First 
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Amendment claims because workplace speech and the right to free ex-
pression can hardly be understood without consideration of context or 
content, as well as the relative interests of the employee and employer. 
For professors at public colleges and universities, it may not be feasible 
to reconcile traditional academic freedom principles that encourage 
scholarly exploration on difficult and sometimes controversial topics 
with Garcetti’s categorical “official duties” reasoning.54 Likewise, Pick-
ering balancing, even given its virtues, may not be the proper approach 
for resolving delicate academic freedom concerns that may disrupt the 
important work performed by scholars and academics in American high-
er education. Thus, reconsideration of the analytical framework used to 
assess academic freedom and the First Amendment protection accorded 
academic speech is required. 
III. WHAT IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM? 
A. The Meaning and Protections of Academic Freedom 
The meaning of academic freedom and the scope of any safeguards 
that flow from such freedom are the source of considerable debate.
55
 
Courts have observed that the term academic freedom is “often used, but 
little explained,”56 and also have indicated that “[w]hile the exact param-
eters of the freedom are less than clear, it is evident that the freedom is 
intended only to prevent government action that ‘cast[s] a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom.’”57 Academic freedom is highly acclaimed in 
American higher education by academic faculty, students, and the educa-
tional institution itself as the freedom to engage in intellectual expression 
without censorship or fear of adverse retaliatory action.
58
 Since the 
1950s, courts have acknowledged that colleges and universities play a 
vital role in the development of our nation’s citizenry and rely on aca-
demic freedom to create and maintain an environment conducive for in-
tellectual discourse and learning. 
From an institutional perspective, the meaning of academic free-
dom was perhaps best captured in the often-cited language from Justice 
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Frankfurter’s 1957 concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.59 In this 
landmark Supreme Court decision, which tested whether faculty academ-
ic speech was entitled to constitutional protection, Frankfurter declared 
that the “business of a university” depends on essential freedoms to fos-
ter an atmosphere for learning: “It is an atmosphere in which there pre-
vail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself 
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall 
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”60 
Thus, the impact of academic freedom permits colleges and univer-
sities to develop degree programs; retain faculty and staff; recruit and 
admit students; and distinguish their academic mission in the higher edu-
cation community without compromise. 
In a 1923 lecture, Harvard University professor Charles Homer 
Haskins described academic freedom as a professor’s intellectual liber-
ty—the right to teach truth as he or she sees it.61 In concert with academ-
ic-freedom protections that extend to the institution, academic freedom 
grants faculty substantial discretion regarding scholarship and teaching 
without the threat of reprisals or disciplinary action to influence their 
academic work. For professors and scholars, academic freedom allows 
autonomy regarding the selection of classroom content and determining 
how academic work shall be performed.
62
 As the activities performed by 
faculty expand beyond teaching and scholarly research, it is unclear 
whether academic freedom will protect all manner of faculty speech.
63
 
In resolving this uncertainty, academic freedom should not be un-
derstood as an isolated concept or self-serving proposition that protects 
the interest of academics without respect to the entire university commu-
nity. For individual faculty, academic freedom must be viewed within the 
institution’s organizational and operational framework. Colleges and 
universities are comprised of students, faculty, support staff, and admin-
istrators with stakeholders that include parents, elected officials, trustees, 
taxpayers, and private donors. In this context, faculty play a vital role in 
the institution, but academic freedom does not provide faculty with an 
unqualified license to free expression. Instead, academic freedom exists 
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to facilitate the scholarly and teaching functions performed by faculty 
and to allow faculty to express themselves freely on academic matters 
that are a central component of the college or university mission. Thus, 
for purposes of this article, academic freedom pertains to potential con-
tent-based restrictions on research, writing, and the viewpoints expressed 
in the classroom. 
Besides the protections academic freedom provides faculty, it also 
distinguishes the faculty from administrators and support-staff members 
of the university community who do not enjoy academic freedom. Rou-
tinely, non-faculty personnel have an at-will relationship with the institu-
tion and may be dismissed without recourse. Less settled or obvious is 
whether faculty members who occupy administrative positions, in addi-
tion to a faculty appointment, remain entitled to academic-freedom pro-
tection and, if so, to what degree. Academics engaged in administrative 
work, depending on the nature and content of the work, may be entitled 
to academic-freedom protection. For example, faculty serving on a pro-
motion and tenure decision-making committee may engage in legitimate 
academic speech that deserves academic-freedom protection. On the oth-
er hand, faculty engaged in administrative work on topics such as strate-
gic planning, editorial boards, or fundraising and alumni affairs might be 
outside the scope of academic-freedom protection. In either case, aca-
demic-freedom protection hinges on the connection academic speech has 
to a particular scholarly or teaching concern. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts to respect the 
academic judgment of university faculty and avoid second-guessing the 
professional judgment of faculty on academic matters.
64
 Hence, the voice 
of the faculty has an important role in managing the academic affairs of 
the institution due to the unique skills they bring to the higher education 
enterprise. But, where faculty speech uttered while performing adminis-
trative duties does not entail a scholarly or academic context, academic-
freedom protection would be misplaced. 
Likewise, faculty “speech” that constitutes disruptive behavior, un-
duly interferes with the institution’s operations, creates a hostile envi-
ronment, or includes profanity, threats, or racial or gender slurs might 
easily be deemed unworthy of academic-freedom protection. Where such 
                                                          
 64. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of 
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speech has no value from a scholarly or pedagogical perspective, aca-
demic freedom is improper.
65
 
Also, it is worth noting that students enjoy a measure of academic 
freedom as well. For instance, among German universities, Lehrfreiheit 
acknowledges the right of students to attend any lecture and the absence 
of required courses.
66
 Students have the freedom to study and learn free 
from harassment or unlawful discrimination but at all times, a student’s 
scholarly status is subject to the faculty. Indeed, for the individual facul-
ty, including full-time faculty, adjunct professors, lecturers, and research 
fellows, academic freedom provides substantial protections that center on 
their roles as teachers and scholars. 
B. Academic Freedom As a Professional Construct 
While academic freedom as a legal concept has garnered significant 
attention in the wake of Garcetti because of concern that the decision 
could lead lower courts to construe academic freedom in an increasingly 
limited manner, it is important to appreciate that academic freedom has 
been characterized and defined as a professional concept as well.
67
 The 
formation and work of the American Association of University Profes-
sors (AAUP) ushered into American higher education a dynamic defini-
tion of academic freedom. The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles 
on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure and the 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom represented the earliest efforts to set 
out academic freedom as a focal point of American higher education and 
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1267–72. 
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the academic profession.
68
 The 1915 Declaration identifies three ele-
ments of academic freedom: “[F]reedom of inquiry and research; free-
dom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extra-
mural utterance and action.”69 
The joint 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure issued by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges 
and Universities sought to define the role of faculty in American higher 
education beyond the typical master-servant relationship, recognizing 
academic freedom as essential for scholars to pursue truth and serve so-
ciety.
70
 Moreover, the 1940 Statement indicated that college and univer-
sity teachers remain free to speak and write as private citizens, but as 
scholars they should remain aware that their utterances may be judged by 
the public.
71
 “Hence, [faculty] should at all times be accurate, should ex-
ercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for opinions of others, 
and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for 
the institution.”72 
Subsequently, the AAUP attempted to refine its position as to ex-
tramural speech in the 1964 Committee A Statement on Extramural Ut-
terances. In pertinent part, this 1964 statement provides: 
The controlling principle is that a faculty member’s expression of 
opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it 
clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her 
position. Extramural utterances rarely bear upon faculty member’s 
fitness for the position. Moreover, a final decision should take into 
account the faculty member’s entire record as teacher and scholar.
73
 
While the AAUP and its collaborative work with the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities represent the collective voices of 
faculty members at the nation’s premiere institutions of higher education, 
the pressing questions raised by these efforts throughout the twentieth 
century appear to be two-fold: “uncertainty as to what academic freedom 
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is” and “if faculty do not know what academic freedom is, who does?”74 
The AAUP has remained an important defender of academic freedom 
rights for faculty, and courts have relied on the policy statements issued 
by the AAUP in numerous judicial opinions. For almost 100 years, the 
AAUP has stood as an important voice in the higher education communi-
ty, advocating a broad interpretation of academic freedom. But there is 
evidence that the AAUP has had its share of failures, as observed by El-
len W. Schrecker.
75
 Her writing regarding academic freedom during the 
McCarthyism era indicated a troubling willingness at local AAUP chap-
ters to avoid academic freedom cases involving individual faculty mem-
bers. Schrecker addressed the AAUP’s practice during this period: 
It was the Association’s standard policy that once a complaint had 
been received, jurisdiction over the case would immediately shift to 
Committee A and the national office. The wisdom of such a policy 
was obvious: local people were often too close to the individuals in-
volved to preserve the detachment necessary for an impartial inves-
tigation. In addition, as was demonstrated at many schools where 
violations of academic freedom occurred, the members of the 
AAUP were reluctant to confront their administration.
76
 
While the AAUP remains a leading voice given the wide array of 
stakeholders that colleges and universities must account for, including 
the government and the private sector, the importance of academic free-
dom is a priority for an increased number of academic groups such as the 
Society for American Law Teachers (SALT), the American Association 
for Law Schools (AALS), the American Library Association (ALA), the 
American Sociological Association (ASA), and various other organiza-
tions. In sum, the meaning of academic freedom may remain difficult to 
define, but the AAUP stands as one of many advocates for academic 
speech protections going forward. 
C. Reflective Academic Freedom Legal Precedent 
Perhaps the darkest period in American history for faculty mem-
bers, academics, and scholars at colleges and universities was the 
McCarthy era.
77
 During the 1950s, the U.S. political landscape was con-
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sumed with the prosecution of those engaged in “un-American activi-
ties.”78 Known as McCarthyism in recognition of Senator Joseph McCar-
thy’s vehement opposition to communism, state and federal officials led 
the nation’s charge against ideological and practical threats to democracy 
and national security. Among those caught up in the whirlwind of suspi-
cion of un-American, unpatriotic behaviors were higher education facul-
ty members.
79
 For scholars and professors at American colleges and uni-
versities, the legal meaning of academic freedom would be seriously ex-
amined as a constitutional matter for the first time. Moreover, the legal 
question as to whether the First Amendment sustained academic freedom 
as a constitutional protection would remain a perplexing constitutional 
question for years to come.
80
 
The challenge of understanding a contemporary judicial meaning of 
academic freedom requires appreciation of the treatment courts have his-
torically extended this seemingly murky subject. For instance in 1951, a 
University of New Hampshire faculty member was subject to a state at-
torney general investigation intended to determine whether his class lec-
tures and activities violated the New Hampshire Subversive Activities 
Act in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.
81
 The New Hampshire law declared 
subversive organizations unlawful, and persons in subversive activities 
(i.e., subversive persons) were disqualified from employment at public 
educational institutions.
82
 In Sweezy, the petitioner-faculty member ap-
peared in two hearings as part of the attorney general’s investigation to 
identify subversive persons within state government.
83
 At both hearings, 
the faculty member declined to answer questions about his alleged con-
tact and involvement with the Communist Party or any program that 
might seek the overthrow of the government.
84
 In particular, the faculty 
member refused to answer questions about the Progressive Party or the 
Progressive Party of America and its members, and refused to answer 
questions regarding a lecture given to students in a humanities course.
85
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The attorney general’s questions were intended to determine whether the 
faculty member was indeed a subversive person as defined by New 
Hampshire law.
86
 Sweezy refused to answer the questions propounded by 
the attorney general because the questions were not pertinent to the mat-
ter under inquiry, and the questions infringed upon an area protected un-
der the First Amendment.
87
 Subsequently, the faculty member was 
brought before the New Hampshire Superior Court to answer these ques-
tions; he again refused and was held in contempt.
88
 The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
89
 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court, finding that Sweezy was denied due pro-
cess as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
90
 
The Court found that the faculty member’s rights to lecture and as-
sociate with others were constitutionally protected freedoms that had 
been abridged by the attorney general’s investigation.91 “We believe that 
there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the areas 
of academic freedom and political expression . . . .”92 Further, the Court 
characterized the necessity for academic freedom at American universi-
ties as “self-evident” based upon the “vital role in a democracy that is 
played by those who guide and train our youth.”93 It is worth noting that 
the Court’s focus here is fixed not on the generalized entity that is the 
college, university, or institution, but rather on “those who guide.”94 
Holding that the Bill of Rights acts as a safeguard that bars invasion of 
the petitioner’s academic liberties, the Court declined to place what it 
referred to as a straitjacket on intellectual leaders at American colleges 
and universities.
95
 To do so, the Court appeared to surmise, would have 
tremendous consequences: “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmos-
phere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always re-
main free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”96 
Expanding on the majority’s holding, Justice Frankfurter offered a 
concurring opinion that characterized the scope of academic freedom and 
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its importance to democracy.
97
 Acknowledging that the petitioner/faculty 
member had a constitutionally guaranteed right to lecture, Frankfurter 
indicated that New Hampshire’s justification for the intrusion was gross-
ly inadequate.
98
 In particular, the state’s reliance on evidence that the 
petitioner was a Socialist affiliated with anti-American groups and co-
editor of an article sympathetic to non-capitalist countries failed to justify 
the government’s intrusion on the petitioner’s intellectual freedoms.99 
Further, the concurring opinion made clear that there was a compelling 
reason to reverse the judgment of the New Hampshire courts because the 
intrusion made by the state’s attorney general represented the kind of evil 
that may erode the spirit of free inquiry that is necessary to sustain a uni-
versity.
100
 
Relying on arguments advanced by academic leaders from Johns 
Hopkins University and Harvard University, Frankfurter compares 
thoughts and actions that are academic and political, and deems both pre-
sumptively immune from inquisition by political authority.
101
 Also, find-
ing that university activities regarding the pursuit of knowledge must be 
left as unfettered as possible, the concurrence stated: “Political power 
must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the 
interest of wise government and the people’s well-being, except for rea-
sons that are exigent and obviously compelling.”102 Hence, although the 
Court’s decision denounced intrusions not by university administrators, 
but off-campus governmental officials, the Court’s decision affirmed the 
nation as a progressive society and academic freedom as a presumptive 
shield against government intrusion. The decision took great care to 
point out the importance of democracy and teaching to the development 
of youth, and the harm that may result from an invasion of academic 
freedom. 
In a similar case, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
103
 faculty mem-
bers at the State University of New York, formerly the University of 
Buffalo, argued that a condition of their employment contracts allowing 
removal for seditious statements or acts was unconstitutionally vague.
104
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The faculty members (appellants) had refused to sign a certificate disa-
vowing Communist ties before the State University implemented new 
provisions in their employment contracts.
105
 The new contract provisions, 
statute §§ 3021 and 3022 of the Education Law and § 105 of the Civil 
Service Law, would presumptively disqualify one from public sector 
employment as a university professor for mere membership in or associa-
tion with a group defined as a subversive organization.
106
 Further, dis-
qualification could not be rebutted by showing non-active membership or 
the absence of intent to pursue unlawful aims.
107
 
The Court explained that language stating that “seditious” or “trea-
sonable” acts pose certain danger to First Amendment freedoms was left 
ill-defined.
108
 The New York law relied upon for purposes of the univer-
sity’s plan applied virtually no limits to what might be meant as seditious 
utterances or acts.
109
 In support of the appellants’ view—that the univer-
sity plan designed to prevent hiring and retention of persons committed 
to subversive behavior was unconstitutionally vague—the Court ob-
served that where academic freedom may be stifled, precision in com-
municating that expression or speech that is not protected is necessary.
110
 
Faculty can and ought to police their classroom speech as well as ideas 
and views they express in the larger marketplace.
111
 For the individual 
faculty member, this may create a challenge if objectionable utterance 
and expression are defined by abstractions.
112
 In this case, the Court 
found that the State University of New York had a legitimate interest—
protecting the educational system from subversion—but that the ap-
proach utilized was unconstitutionally vague.
113
 
The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of 
its proscriptions make it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism. 
It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as possible 
from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by en-
meshing him in this intricate machinery . . . . The result must be to 
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stifle ‘that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially 
to cultivate and practice . . . .’
114
 
Put another way, the Court found that the university’s approach to 
eradicating subversion could be viewed as having a chilling effect that 
stifled the “free play of spirit” and fundamental personal liberties upon 
which academic freedom depends.
115
 Moreover, the Court was compelled 
to strike down the State University of New York program as unconstitu-
tionally vague for practical reasons as well: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.
116
 
The individual faculty member serves as a resource for the academ-
ic process. However, academic employment should not be contingent on 
the forfeiture of constitutional liberties. Acceptance of such tenets would 
undermine the mission of American higher education and place an intel-
lectual ban on the development of our country’s leadership. Our juris-
prudence has rejected such an approach and protects the liberty rights of 
faculty in the interests of freedom, democracy, and preparation of the 
future citizenry.
117
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Sweezy and Keyishian sup-
port the freedom of individual faculty members to pursue associations or 
activities guided by their intellectual interests. These decisions 
acknowledge the importance that the individual faculty member maintain 
the freedom to pursue intellectual matters at his or her discretion without 
fear of reprisal and the harm that might result from stifling free expres-
sion. Subsequent decisions have also embraced the viewpoint that faculty 
should be extended significant discretion.
118
 Moreover, our jurisprudence 
does not dismiss the place of the educational institution. “Academic 
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of 
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ideas among teachers and students . . . but also, and somewhat inconsist-
ently, on autonomous decision making by the academy itself.”119 
In NLRB v. Yeshiva,
120
 the Court addressed whether full-time facul-
ty functioned as supervisory and managerial employees entitled to col-
lectively bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
121
 The 
National Labor Relations Board (Board) granted the Yeshiva University 
Faculty Association (Union) petition for certification allowing the Union 
to organize as a collective bargaining unit.
122
 The university, however, 
refused to bargain with the Union, arguing that the faculty members were 
managerial employees and thus excluded from the benefits of the 
NLRA.
123
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the 
university, denying the petition, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.
124
 
In discussing the scope of the faculty’s role in the modern university, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the question of whether faculty employ-
ees were managerial personnel was dependent on how a faculty is struc-
tured and operates.
125
 Also, the Court’s decision was influenced by the 
belief that notions of shared authority and collegiality often involve fac-
ulty participation in academic and non-academic matters such as person-
nel decisions, student affairs, and campus facilities.
126
 Are faculty mem-
bers entitled to academic freedom regarding non-academic tasks per-
formed in the course of their academic employment? Obviously, the 
scope of protections provided by academic freedom may be viewed as 
identifying those professorial functions that are highly valued versus 
those activities that are not. For this reason, academic freedom is and has 
remained a treasured asset for college and university professors. 
1. Balancing Faculty and Institutional Interests 
Whether the Garcetti holding undermines academic freedom for 
faculty speech regarding teaching, research, or related service activities 
is the critical question going forward. A general decision that First 
Amendment protection does not extend to the speech of public-sector 
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employees offered in performance of their official job duties would strike 
a tremendous blow to professorial expression at public colleges and uni-
versities. Without more guidance from the Supreme Court, Garcetti’s 
impact on academic speech may be difficult to determine. 
Garcetti arguably impacts academic freedom from three plausible 
perspectives. First, Garcetti could be viewed as categorically under-
estimating the corrosive effect the “official duties” test might have on 
academic-freedom protections because a faculty member’s official duties 
include core speech activity, such as scholarship and teaching. Second, 
Garcetti could be seen as the Court’s continuing effort to elevate the 
public employer’s interest in workplace efficiency while being almost 
dismissive of academic speech and its complexities. In either case, un-
derstanding academic or professorial speech is essential to distinguishing 
the work performed by college professors from that of other public sector 
employees. Finally, Garcetti may usher in an era that may advance aca-
demic freedom for core academic functions while assessing the scope of 
academic-freedom protection provided to faculty performing administra-
tive work as part of their official duties on a case-by-case basis. 
The official duties of a public university professor or academic are 
distinguishable from those performed by other public-sector employees. 
While sharing expertise and counseling others may represent the full-
range of job responsibilities performed by some public-sector employees, 
this is just the beginning for a faculty member in American higher educa-
tion. The college professor’s job duties are varied and often defy a sim-
ple explanation. The day-to-day tasks and responsibilities of a professor 
might routinely include classroom teaching, advising students and col-
leagues, scholarly research, preparing manuscripts for publication, sym-
posia participation, committee service, faculty governance, public speak-
ing, media communications, as well as the numerous foundational activi-
ties that underlie these tasks. The varied nature of the activities on this 
list hint at the complexity involved in actually determining a faculty 
member’s “official job duties.” As Justice Kennedy indicated in the Gar-
cetti majority opinion, however, the proper method of determining an 
employee’s job duties relies on a practical inquiry.127 But that inquiry can 
be complex for academics due to the nature of academic speech. Recent-
ly, scholars have discussed the broad reach of professorial free speech 
rights: 
The right to speak freely on matters of public concern most obvi-
ously covers the extramural speech of professors when, for exam-
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ple, they publish in newspapers, appear on television or write blogs 
to comment on matters of current political debate. But it may also 
cover intramural speech, commenting on the administration of their 
universities or criticizing [sic] the poor running of a department or 
research centre [sic].
128
 
Others have agreed that defining duties inherent in a faculty job is 
not a simple matter. “When it comes, for example, to ‘official duties,’ the 
clarity with which a court can determine the responsibilities of an assis-
tant district attorney . . . simply does not apply to college professors.”129 
For public employees, including faculty and professors at public 
universities, the First Amendment does protect their right to speak on 
matters of public concern. This protection, however, does not extend to 
matters that are purely internal or disruptive to the operation of the or-
ganization. Pickering
130
 and Connick
131
 both deal with the question of 
whether the speech of public employees is entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. In Pickering, a public high school teacher was discharged for 
sending a letter to a local newspaper that criticized efforts by the school 
board and superintendent to raise new revenue for the schools.
132
 The 
teacher’s speech was found to be detrimental to the efficient operation of 
the school district.
133
 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, observed 
that the teacher’s speech involved a matter of public concern and as such, 
“statements by public officials on matters of public concern must be ac-
corded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements 
are directed at their nominal superiors.”134 Here, the teacher’s right to 
freely voice his concerns on matters of public importance was not out-
weighed by the employer’s efficiency interests relative to the manage-
ment of its workforce. 
In Connick, Shelia Myers, an assistant district attorney in the Orle-
ans Parish District Attorney’s Office, was notified that she would be 
transferred to a different section of the criminal court to perform her du-
ties as a prosecutor.
135
 Myers opposed the transfer and shared her con-
cerns with her superiors.
136
 Although urged to accept the transfer, Myers 
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took matters into her own hands by preparing and circulating a question-
naire among her co-workers regarding the office transfer policy, office 
morale, the need for a grievance committee, and whether employees felt 
pressured to work on political campaigns.
137
 Once Myers distributed the 
questionnaires, she was credited with creating a “mini-insurrection” 
within the office, which led to the decision to terminate her employment 
for refusing to accept the transfer.
138
 
Myers filed suit in federal court alleging that she was wrongfully 
terminated in violation of her constitutional right to free speech.
139
 The 
district court agreed, finding that the questionnaire, not her refusal to ac-
cept the transfer, was the true reason for her termination.
140
 Moreover, 
the district court found that the questionnaire dealt with a matter of pub-
lic concern and that the district attorney, herein the public employer, had 
failed to demonstrate that Myers’s speech interfered with the operations 
of the district attorney’s office.141 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the decision.
142
 
The Supreme Court accepted this matter for review, noting that 
“[f]or most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public 
employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of 
employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitu-
tional rights.”143 The Court further indicated that after a series of disputes 
during the 1950s and thereafter, the primary issue became whether pub-
lic-employee speech could be suppressed by threat of employment ter-
mination when the employees joined political associations that public 
officials deemed subversive.
144
 Finding that the First Amendment was 
designed to assure free expression and the unfettered interchange of ide-
as, Connick followed Pickering’s rationale that the First Amendment 
protects public-employee speech on matters of legitimate concern.
145
 
On this basis, the Supreme Court found that Myers’s speech in-
volved only a matter of personal interest, rather than public concern, and 
was not entitled to First Amendment protection: 
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, 
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government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their 
offices without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of 
the First Amendment.
146
 
The Court also determined that the question of whether an employ-
ee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern turns on “the content, 
form, and context of [the] given statement . . . .”147 In sum, the Connick 
Court gave significant attention to the employer’s interest in the effective 
and efficient operation of its public office and to the argument that “the 
First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a 
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”148 My-
ers’s questionnaire was characterized as an employee grievance regard-
ing internal office policy and therefore undeserving of First Amendment 
protection. 
Under Pickering, and confirmed in Connick, the Court embraced a 
multi-part analysis for public-employee free speech challenges that could 
apply to college and university faculty members.
149
 First, the employee’s 
speech must address a “matter of public concern.”150 Next, the employ-
ee’s interest in free expression must be balanced against the public em-
ployer’s interest in efficient operation of the workplace.151 Finally, the 
employee must show that her protected speech was a motivating factor 
that led to the disciplinary action. Likewise, if the public employer can 
show that the disciplinary action would have been imposed regardless of 
the employee’s protected speech, no First Amendment protections should 
be extended.
152
 Though the analytical approach applied in Pickering and 
Connick provided no bright-line rule regarding the scope of free-speech 
protection that may be available to any public employee, the Supreme 
Court’s guidance effectively offered an avenue to accommodate the 
complexity of free-speech disputes in higher education. It directed lower 
courts and college and university decision makers to weigh the interests 
of the parties rather than rely exclusively on content-based and role-
based analyses. 
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The concerns examined in Connick, with regard to the operational 
and efficiency interests of the public-sector employer, again were ad-
dressed by the Court in Waters v. Churchill.
153
 Waters involved the ter-
mination of a nurse at a public hospital after she made personal and dis-
ruptive remarks.
154
 The nurse argued that her comments, indicating that 
nurses worked in certain areas without proper training, only criticized the 
hospital’s cross-training policy.155 But her supervisor believed that her 
comments promoted a negative atmosphere, reflected poorly on the hos-
pital, and could not be tolerated.
156
 In the plurality opinion issued by the 
Court, Justice O’Connor, writing for four Justices, relied on the standard 
announced in Connick and Pickering as to when public employee’s 
speech is protected by the First Amendment: 
To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, 
and the employee’s interest in expressing herself on this matter 
must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees.
157
 
Believing that insufficient weight was given to the public employ-
er’s interest in efficient employment decision making, Justice O’Connor 
appeared to support application of the Connick approach where the em-
ployer makes a reasonable investigation to determine the content of the 
speech before firing an employee.
158
 In this case, Justice O’Connor ob-
served that the potential disruptive impact of the nurse’s speech threat-
ened to undermine the public employer’s authority.159 Thus, the matter 
was vacated and remanded to determine whether the nurse was indeed 
terminated for her disruptive, unprotected comments rather than her 
statements about cross-training.
160
 
A worthwhile example of the Pickering-Connick approach in the 
higher education context is found in the convoluted dispute in Webb v. 
Board of Trustees of Ball State University.
161
 Professor Gary L. Webb, a 
tenured faculty member in Ball State’s criminology department, filed a 
complaint in federal court alleging, among other things, that changes to 
                                                          
 153. 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 154. See id. at 661. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 665. 
 157. Id. at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Id. at 676. 
 159. Id. at 681. 
 160. Justice Scalia, writing for three Justices, concurred in the judgment but declined to require 
any constitutional investigation terminating an employee. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 161. 167 F.3d 1146, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1999). 
2013] Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech: Post-Garcetti 25 
his teaching schedule and the decision to replace him as chairperson for 
the criminology department were implemented by the university in retal-
iation for Webb’s protected speech.162 In 1994, Webb complained that 
another faculty member sexually harassed a student, alleged that admin-
istrators were guilty of “ethical lapses,” and made various accusations of 
misconduct against other members of the department.
163
 Professor Webb 
argued that his sexual harassment complaint and the related complaints 
that he later presented in a 225-page document were protected speech, 
which prompted him to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and, thereafter, seek a preliminary injunction di-
recting the university to stop any retaliatory action.
164
 
Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, 
affirmed the decision denying the preliminary injunction, finding an ab-
sence of irreparable harm, and acknowledging the potential disruptive 
effects to the faculty at large caused by an injunction requiring the uni-
versity to implement changes to its teaching schedule.
165
 Moreover, rely-
ing on the Pickering-Connick analysis, Judge Easterbrook was not per-
suaded that Professor Webb’s speech represented a matter of public con-
cern under the Pickering analysis or that changing his teaching schedule 
violated his constitutional right to free expression.
166
 Although Judge 
Easterbrook maintained that the university’s decision to change Professor 
Webb’s teaching schedule and to replace him as chair of the criminology 
department, viewed in the context of the numerous administrative dis-
putes, could be deemed as retaliatory action, the court chose to balance 
the university’s right to set curriculum and a faculty member’s right to 
free expression—in effect, seeking to balance academic freedom inter-
ests held by the faculty and institution.
167
 
In sum, the court resolved that Professor Webb’s contentions em-
bodied nothing more than a mangled dispute between faculty and admin-
istrators at the university. According to the court, a university’s “ability 
to set a curriculum is as much an element of academic freedom as any 
scholar’s right to express a point of view.”168 Where the core functions of 
teaching and scholarship are at issue, the court stated the following: 
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Universities are entitled to insist that members of the faculty (and 
their administrative aides) devote their energies to promoting the 
goals such as research and teaching. When the bulk of a professor’s 
time goes over to fraternal warfare, students and the scholarly 
community alike suffer, and the university may intervene to restore 
decorum and ease tensions. 
169
 
While not denouncing individual academic freedom, the court ex-
pressed an unwillingness to intervene or set out when courts might inter-
fere with a university’s curriculum planning or staffing decisions.170 The 
Seventh Circuit framed academic freedom in the context of research and 
teaching but with limits that recognized the institution’s voice apart from 
that of the individual faculty member. 
Furthermore, the court’s exercise of restraint in Webb, with respect 
to faculty demands that their views be given unlimited protection, is con-
sistent with prior rulings. Academic freedom is neither a license for un-
limited expression nor a basis to permit dysfunctional operations within 
the institution.
171
 While academic freedom is not a right enumerated in 
the Constitution, it is safeguarded by the First Amendment to preserve 
the exchange of intellectual ideas at colleges and universities.
172
 The 
Pickering and Connick decisions, while not higher education cases per 
se, have been applied to resolve academic speech disputes where First 
Amendment academic-freedom protections are concerned.
173
 Garcetti 
imposes new analytical concerns regarding academic speech and consti-
tutional protections. 
Public employees do not abandon their First Amendment right to 
free speech upon entering the government-sponsored workplace; they 
retain the right to speak out publicly as citizens on matters of public con-
cern—not purely internal matters or matters intended to disrupt work-
place operations. Despite these safeguards, Garcetti’s “official duties” 
test triggers important questions regarding what constitutional protec-
tions are available for statements uttered by professors at public universi-
ties in the course of performing their official job duties.
174
 
Under Garcetti, legitimate academic speech on controversial sub-
ject matter may not have an adequate umbrella of protection. College and 
university professors do not exclusively speak out as citizens on matters 
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of public concern. At public colleges and universities, academics speak-
ing and writing as teachers, scholars, researchers, committee members, 
or public servants on matters within the scope of their professorial duties 
may or may not address matters of public concern. This does not suggest 
that faculty should be granted an absolute right to free expression under 
the guise of academic freedom. But the law should permit a balance to be 
struck between professorial free speech interests and institutional inter-
ests regarding workforce control. For instance, with regard to classroom 
speech, Professor Michael Olivas has observed the following: 
[E]xpression of controversial ideas and criticism of the status quo 
must be protected, even at the risk of discomfort for the teacher or 
class, when a professor is teaching within her field. . . . But academ-
ics still must adhere to professional standards in voicing their views. 
This “professorial function” approach protects classroom utterances 
so long as they meet professional standards and result from training, 
developed expertise, and scrupulous care in presenting material. . . . 
Faculty should be entitled to special consideration only in pursuing 
academic endeavors (hence “academic” freedom), such as in the 
classroom. Extending the protections of academic freedom to extra-
academic speech, in this light, is unprincipled.
175
 
Moreover, curtailing professorial speech that cannot survive a ger-
maneness inquiry—a test that determines whether an individual’s aca-
demic speech is sufficiently close to the university’s academic mission—
may also serve as a justifiable control on academic freedom.
176
 
However, applying Garcetti’s “official duties” analysis to academic 
speech, whether uttered inside or outside the classroom, may lead to a 
determination that such speech offered in the course of performing one’s 
official job duties is not protected speech. Because professors at public 
colleges and universities may engage in intramural and extramural 
speech within the scope of their employment, Garcetti may go too far. 
Pursuant to Pickering and Connick, the First Amendment appears to pro-
tect professorial expression on matters of public concern. “Academics’ 
extramural expression is protected by the First Amendment, unless a 
university can show that it has the potential seriously to disrupt working 
relations on campus and that this risk outweighs the value of the 
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speech.”177 Further Supreme Court guidance is necessary because public 
college or university professors do not exclusively speak out as “citi-
zens” within the Pickering or Garcetti sense, but as academics and ex-
perts. Faculty should be free to comment on an array of matters im-
portant to society without looking over their collective shoulders to see 
whether they are being monitored.
178
 Garcetti, therefore, has opened the 
door to a renewed conversation about academic freedom. Do the prevail-
ing arguments set out in Pickering, Connick, Waters, and now Garcetti 
mark only support for the public employer’s efficiency interests at the 
expense of individual academic freedom? Or, does Garcetti represent 
confirmation that the First Amendment secures the core academic free-
doms for teaching and scholarship, but that academic speech without an 
academic foundation and critical of administrative matters is not consti-
tutionally protected? The post-Garcetti case law provides helpful insight. 
2. Contemplating the Post-Garcetti Case Law 
The Garcetti decision has led lower courts to carefully construe the 
work performed by individual faculty and its connection to core academ-
ic functions at public colleges and universities. In assessing whether a 
faculty member’s speech represents official job duties, some courts have 
been inclined to set aside academic-freedom protections and uphold dis-
ciplinary action by college and university administrators for faculty 
speech unrelated to teaching or scholarship. Also, lower courts have rec-
ognized Garcetti as an opportunity to take pause before affirming an em-
ployer’s disciplinary action. Among these post-Garcetti decisions, Kerr 
v. Hurd
179
 represents a well-reasoned application of the Garcetti holding. 
In Kerr, the interplay between the official-duties analysis and aca-
demic freedom was examined within the context of statements made dur-
ing classroom instruction.
180
 Elton R. Kerr, an assistant professor at the 
Wright State School of Medicine (WS-SOM) filed an action in federal 
court alleging, inter alia, a violation of his rights to expression under the 
United States and Ohio constitutions.
181
 Dr. Kerr, a specialist of obstet-
rics and gynecology, contended that he was subject to discipline for 
“teaching certain gynecological surgery techniques, advocation [sic] of 
vaginal delivery over unnecessary cesarian procedures, and lecturing 
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WS-SOM residents on the proper and appropriate use of forceps.”182 Dr. 
William W. Hurd, the chair for the Department of Obstetrics and Gyne-
cology at WS-SOM and a named defendant in the action, argued that Dr. 
Kerr’s speech on the use of forceps and vaginal delivery was within his 
role as an employee and not entitled to First Amendment protection.
183
 
In applying the precedent set by the Garcetti decision, the court in-
dicated that the Supreme Court’s holding represented a refinement of its 
“Connick jurisprudence” requiring a role-based analysis and content-
based analysis.
184
 The court found that Dr. Kerr’s speech advocating vag-
inal deliveries was within his role as a teacher of obstetrics; however, 
rather than applying the official-duty analysis and declaring Dr. Kerr’s 
speech unprotected, the district court observed that the Supreme Court 
left undecided whether the official-duty analysis would apply in an aca-
demic setting.
185
 More specifically, the court declined to apply the offi-
cial-duty analysis and instead applied the “traditional Pickering-Connick 
approach” to Dr. Kerr’s in-class speech.186 Furthermore, the court ob-
served that an academic freedom exception was important to protecting 
First Amendment values: 
Universities should be the active trading floors in the marketplace 
of ideas. Public universities should be no different from private uni-
versities in that respect. At least where, as here, the expressed views 
are well within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should 
certainly receive First Amendment protection, particularly at the 
university level. The disastrous impact on Soviet agriculture from 
Stalin’s enforcement of Lysenko biology orthodoxy stands as a 
strong counter example to those who would discipline university 
professors for not following the “party line.”
187
 
Even if academic freedom was viewed as a narrow exception to 
Garcetti, the court found no basis to construe Dr. Kerr’s teaching as a 
medical professor as outside the classroom or clinical context. Hence, 
speech grounded in a professor’s academic or clinical expertise may be 
entitled to constitutional protection. Of course, speech in a clinical con-
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text may go beyond typical classroom instruction, raising an important 
question regarding the fundamental role of the college or university pro-
fessor and the scope of academic freedom. 
Whether Garcetti categorically denies constitutional protection to 
academic speech was also at issue in Adams v. Trustees of the University 
of North Carolina-Wilmington.
188
 In this case, a criminology professor, 
Michael S. Adams, alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim after 
being denied a promotion to full professor.
189
 Professor Adams joined the 
faculty at UNCW in 1993 and was granted tenure in 1998.
190
 In 2000, 
Professor Adams became a Christian; this had a significant influence on 
his scholarly writing and service activities, which took a decidedly con-
servative tone.
191
 On occasion, the university received complaints from 
faculty, staff, and university trustees regarding Professor Adams’s public 
expressions.
192
 In 2004, Professor Adams’s application for promotion to 
the rank of full professor was denied for, among other reasons, an insuf-
ficient record of tangible academic productivity.
193
 
In response to Professor Adams’s complaint, UNCW filed a motion 
for summary judgment that was granted by the district court.
194
 On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit identified several errors in the lower court’s rul-
ing as to the First Amendment claim, all of which demonstrated a mis-
reading of Garcetti.
195
 While the district court correctly understood that 
Garcetti’s analysis focused on the role of the speaker, not the content of 
the speech, it held that Professor Adams’s speech—comprised of books 
and written commentaries—was not protected by the First Amendment 
because it was included in his application for promotion to full profes-
sor.
196
 Finding that “the nature of the employee’s speech at the time it 
was made” significant, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred 
as a matter of law by concluding that Professor Adams’s speech was 
converted to unprotected speech.
197
 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit observed that the district court ig-
nored the Supreme Court’s language that left uncertain whether Garcetti 
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applied in an academic context at a public university.
198
 According to the 
court, “[t]he plain language of Garcetti thus explicitly left open the ques-
tion of whether its principles apply in the academic genre where issues of 
‘scholarship or teaching’ are in play.”199 Also, the court noted that 
“[t]here may be instances in which a public university faculty member’s 
assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering uni-
versity policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching.”200 In such a situa-
tion, Garcetti would appear to apply. But where the speech at issue cen-
tered on scholarship and teaching, the Fourth Circuit held that the district 
court erred in applying Garcetti and identified the Pickering-Connick 
standard as the proper analytical approach.
201
 The court’s reasoning gave 
ample consideration to professorial work and the nature of faculty 
speech: 
Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university fac-
ulty member under the facts of this case could place beyond the 
reach of First Amendment protection many forms of public speech 
or service a professor engaged in during his employment. That 
would not appear to be what Garcetti intended, nor is it consistent 
with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses his abil-
ity to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. In 
light of the above factors, we will not apply Garcetti to the circum-
stances of this case.
202
 
Thereafter, the court determined that Professor Adams’s speech was 
that of a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern, but remanded the 
case for further proceedings under the Pickering-Connick analytical 
framework.
203
 
Despite Garcetti’s holding that public-employee statements made 
in the course of official job duties are not constitutionally protected, Kerr 
and Adams signify that where academics at public colleges and universi-
ties engage in speech involving core academic functions, such expression 
may be protected. Regardless of whether the speech involves a faculty 
member teaching surgical procedures to medical students, or a professor 
writing scholarly articles and books that examine social or political is-
sues, courts appear unwilling to endorse administrative decision-making 
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that interferes with fundamental academic freedoms regarding teaching 
and research. 
Although Kerr and Adams extend First Amendment protection to 
speech involving core academic functions, the role of a professor rou-
tinely involves the opportunity or obligation to comment on managerial 
or administrative matters that may involve the allocation of resources, 
personnel decisions, or institutional procedures. For example, in Hong v. 
Grant,
204
 a chemical engineering professor at the University of Califor-
nia-Irvine (UC Irvine) filed a complaint in federal court alleging an aca-
demic freedom violation regarding critical remarks he made about hiring 
and promotion decisions within the department.
205
 In particular, Profes-
sor Hong objected to administrative decisions made in 2003 that led to 
the use of lecturers, rather than tenured faculty, to teach undergraduate 
courses, and a decision to grant a professor’s application for an acceler-
ated merit salary increase.
206
 Professor Hong also objected to a 2004 de-
cision to extend an informal offer of employment to another individu-
al.
207
 Subsequently, Hong applied for a merit salary increase, which was 
allegedly denied because his research activities were insufficient.
208
 This 
led to his pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California.
209
 
Professor Hong alleged that he was a victim of illegal retaliation in 
response to his vocal criticism of various decisions by university admin-
istrators.
210
 The district court dismissed the complaint finding that 
Hong’s statements did not constitute a matter of public concern and were 
therefore not protected by the First Amendment.
211
 Further, the district 
court found that Hong’s criticisms were merely internal administrative 
comments uttered in the context of Hong’s official duties, consistent with 
the reasoning set out in Garcetti.
212
 This finding compelled the district 
court to disagree with Hong’s contention that his statements represented 
speech entitled to First Amendment protection.
213
 To hold otherwise, ac-
                                                          
 204. 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 236 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 205. Id. at 1160. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1163. 
 208. Id. at 1164. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1169. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1170; see also McReady v. O’Malley, 804 F. Supp. 2d 427 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 
468 F. App’x 391 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 577 (2012) (granting university’s motion 
for summary judgment against free speech claims raised by pro se faculty member who expressed 
 
2013] Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech: Post-Garcetti 33 
cording to the district court, would invite expansive constitutionalism 
that would perhaps trigger endless judicial supervision for routine uni-
versity administrative decisions.
214
 
Professor Hong’s argument that his intramural speech criticizing 
decisions implemented by administrators at UC Irvine should be granted 
First Amendment protection was defeated by the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion. The court relied largely on the Garcetti holding but 
gave little attention to Justice Kennedy’s cautionary proviso that speech 
related to academic matters may be afforded some protection. While Pro-
fessor Hong’s speech was viewed relative to context, content, and form, 
it appears that the undisputed fact that Hong’s statements were made in 
the context of his faculty duties triggered no First Amendment protec-
tion. 
Particularly interesting was the court’s characterization that Profes-
sor Hong’s speech represented “internal administrative disputes which 
have little or no relevance to the community as a whole.”215 While 
Hong’s objections to certain hiring and promotion decisions may not re-
late to traditional academic duties like teaching or research, his state-
ments concerning the use of lecturers to staff departmental courses could 
be construed as an academic matter. “Mr. Hong . . . felt it was the de-
partment’s obligation to its students to staff courses with experienced 
faculty, rather than younger, transient lecturers.”216 By assessing that 
Hong’s speech essentially represented an “internal administrative dis-
pute,” the case contrasts the circumstances at issue in Kerr and Adams, 
which protect “core” academic freedom concerns. Hence, faculty speech 
performing dual administrative and academic functions arguably will be 
subject to more scrutiny to determine whether such speech merits aca-
demic-freedom protection post-Garcetti. 
Hong’s application of the Garcetti decision appears to indicate that 
faculty speech on administrative or quasi-administrative matters shall 
neither garner First Amendment protection nor represent an exercise of 
academic freedom. But what remains unanswered is what speech or 
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statements uttered by individual faculty members are entitled to First 
Amendment protection. Further, how ought higher education administra-
tors and faculty determine whether individual faculty speech uttered in 
the course of performing official duties merits employer disciplinary ac-
tion? 
In Renken v. Gregory,
217
 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a retaliation 
complaint raised by Professor Kevin Renken for allegedly engaging in 
protected academic speech related to a National Science Foundation 
(NSF) grant to support programs at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, College of Engineering and Applied Sciences.
218
 After dif-
ferences arose as to the conditions under which the grant would be ad-
ministered and how the university would contribute matching funds, the 
university decided to return the grant to the NSF.
219
 Professor Renken 
filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the decision to terminate 
the grant, inter alia, was a retaliatory act by the university in response to 
his extensive criticisms of the university’s proposed use of the grant 
funds.
220
 
Professor Renken’s involvement with the NSF grant included the 
dual role of principal investigator (PI) and university faculty member.
221
 
Acknowledging Renken’s numerous complaints about the grant’s admin-
istration, the court observed that “Renken was speaking as a faculty em-
ployee, and not as a private citizen because administering the grant as a 
PI fell within the teaching and service duties that he was employed to 
perform.”222 The court found that Professor Renken’s administration of 
the NSF grant fell squarely within his teaching duties: “[H]is employ-
ment status a[s] full professor depended on the administration of grants, 
such as the NSF grant. It was in the course of that administration, that 
Renken made his statements about funding improprieties within the con-
fines of the University system and as the principal PI.”223 
The court found Renken’s speech undeserving of First Amendment 
protection, but simultaneously framed the speech as part of his official 
teaching duties.
224
 With little or no consideration of Justice Kennedy’s 
caveat that speech regarding teaching and scholarship might deserve 
constitutional protection, the court surmised that Renken’s speech, while 
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part of his teaching duties, was not protected pursuant to Garcetti.
225
 
Moreover, the Renken decision demonstrates the inadequacy of Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion wherein he chose not to address the extent 
to which the Garcetti holding supported the protection of speech related 
to teaching.
226
 
Likewise, other post-Garcetti decisions have granted public univer-
sity employers wide latitude to impose disciplinary action in response to 
individual faculty speech uttered in the course of performing official du-
ties, especially those duties involving administrative functions. In Gorum 
v. Sessoms,
227
 a 2005 decision by the Delaware State University president 
to terminate a faculty member and department chairperson for changing 
withdrawals, incompletes, and failing grades without authorization was 
challenged on First Amendment grounds.
228
 President Sessoms found 
Professor Gorum’s conduct unprofessional and highly reprehensible.229 
Professor Gorum admitted that he made the changes but claimed that he 
had sufficient authorization.
230
 Moreover, Gorum countered that the ter-
mination decision was a retaliatory act intended to punish him for acting 
as an advisor to a student-athlete charged with violating university policy 
barring weapons possession in 2002, and as chairman of a speakers 
committee in 2004 for rescinding an invitation to President Sessoms to 
speak at a prayer breakfast event.
231
 The district court granted the univer-
sity’s motion for summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed the 
finding that Professor Gorum’s speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment.
232
 
The court relied on Garcetti but took some care to explain that the 
Supreme Court did not answer whether the “official duty” analysis would 
apply in a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.
233
 As 
such, the court acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s caveat in Garcetti that 
an argument may be sustained that expressions related to academic 
scholarship and classroom instruction may trigger constitutional con-
cerns not addressed by customary employee-speech jurisprudence.
234
 
Because Professor Gorum’s speech was unrelated to scholarship and 
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classroom instruction, the court believed it was bound to apply the offi-
cial duties test, thereby resolving that Professor Gorum’s speech was not 
entitled to First Amendment protection.
235
 Moreover, the court attempted 
to clarify when the official duty test should not apply: 
Where Garcetti’s official duty test does not apply to a public in-
structor’s speech “related to scholarship or teaching,” courts apply 
the traditional First Amendment protected speech analysis estab-
lished in [Pickering and Connick] . . . . This is a two-step analysis. 
The first considers whether the employee’s speech was on a matter 
of public concern. If so, the second requires balancing “between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-
ters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”
236
 
It is worth noting that Professor Gorum’s advising activities with 
the student-athlete, DaShaun Morris, were found within the scope of his 
official duties because it was through his position as a faculty member 
and department chair that he was able to advise the student.
237
 Despite 
this finding, Professor Gorum’s speech was not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.
238
 This suggests that speech made in the course of advis-
ing or mentoring students may not be constitutionally protected as a 
function of academic freedom; however, it is plausible that the nature of 
the “advising” might dictate a different result. For example, faculty 
speaking in an advisory capacity regarding the content of a student essay 
would make a stronger case for academic-freedom protection as com-
pared to advising on a student disciplinary matter.
239
 There may be no 
other task performed by a professor or teacher more sensitive than men-
toring a student, sometimes through difficult situations. While individual 
faculty may rely on academic freedom to protect speech regarding their 
scholarly and instructional activities, student mentoring and advising that 
lacks an academic foundation is arguably outside the reach of academic-
freedom protection. 
In another academic affairs decision at the University of Illinois, 
College of Medicine at Chicago, the head of the department of surgery 
alleged that the university and certain administrators retaliated against 
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him in violation of his First Amendment rights.
240
 Specifically in Abcari-
an v. McDonald, Dr. Herand Abcarian claimed that the defendants con-
spired to damage his professional reputation by executing a settlement 
agreement regarding a medical malpractice lawsuit filed as a result of a 
patient’s death.241 Abcarian believed that because he voiced disagree-
ment with university officials on numerous administrative matters (facul-
ty recruitment, risk management, compensation, etc.), the settlement 
agreement was implemented and reported to state and federal authorities 
as a retaliatory act to connect Abcarian to the medical malpractice 
claim.
242
 Abcarian brought a lawsuit against the university and various 
individual employees, raising several claims including a First Amend-
ment retaliation claim.
243
 The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding 
that Garcetti barred the First Amendment claims because the speech that 
triggered the alleged retaliation was made in the course of Abcarian per-
forming his official duties as a public employee.
244
 
Before the Seventh Circuit, Abcarian argued that Garcetti applied 
only to bar retaliation claims against employers, not individual co-
employees, and that his speech was not offered pursuant to his official 
job responsibilities.
245
 Reading Garcetti broadly, the court rejected this 
argument, finding that the decision applied to retaliation claims against 
fellow employees.
246
 Also, the court noted that Garcetti established that 
public employees speaking as part of their official duties are speaking as 
employees, not citizens, and their speech is not protected regardless of 
the content.
247
 This conclusion may have serious ramifications for any 
argument that attempts to limit the import of Garcetti to professors and 
academics relative to the content or purpose of academic speech. While 
the court resolved that Abcarian was not speaking in a purely academic 
sense, the court’s willingness to read Garcetti broadly may impact the 
extent to which academic-freedom protection is granted going for-
ward.
248
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Further, the court found unpersuasive Abcarian’s alternative argu-
ment that his speech was not made pursuant to his official responsibili-
ties: “When determining whether a plaintiff spoke as an employee or as a 
citizen, we take a practical view of the facts alleged in the complaint, 
looking to the employee’s level of responsibility and the context in 
which the statements were made.”249 
Abcarian held a position of significant authority at the University of 
Illinois College of Medicine and had a wide range of responsibilities im-
portant to the management of the institution. The court cautiously noted 
that Abcarian’s speech did not warrant academic-freedom protection be-
cause of its administrative nature and resolved that his speech sprang 
from his public employment, not his status as citizen.
250
 Thus, Garcetti 
was properly applied and Abcarian’s First Amendment claim dismissed 
because the speech at issue—policy-driven and administrative in 
origin—was not constitutionally protected.251 
                                                                                                                                  
tion for the human quest for a life’s meaning, and civic engagement; advancing the fron-
tiers of knowledge and discourse. As a matter of ideal and aspiration, universities and 
university professors may think of themselves as pursuing these functions with especially 
dedicated intellectual elevation, intellectual honesty, objectivity, and rigor. But as the Su-
preme Court’s cases persistently insist, there is a difference between the recognition of 
these functions as justifications for our societal policies, and the recognition of these 
functions as justifications for the creation of a distinct constitutional right. . . . Constitu-
tional doctrines can at times be stultifying, tending to act as both floors and ceilings, di-
minishing autonomy and diversity. It is not a good idea to try to constitutionalize every-
thing. When constitutional law appropriates too many of our important societal decisions, 
the currency of the Constitution as a fundamental law is devalued. When everything is 
constitutionalized, nothing is constitutionalized. 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO COLLEGE: FIVE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS THAT 
HAVE SHAPED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 36–37 (2011). 
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Further, the district court indicated that while the Supreme Court in Garcetti had not resolved 
whether academic expression, other than perhaps scholarship and classroom teaching, was constitu-
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In Hong, Renken, Gorum, and Abcarian, the alleged academic 
speech at issue did not draw a direct connection to scholarship or teach-
ing, but rather was aligned with quasi-administrative matters. The speech 
at issue in Hong may make the best argument for some scholarly or 
teaching affiliation, as Professor Hong’s expression dealt with the ap-
pointment of lecturers versus fulltime tenured faculty to teach certain 
classes. However, the court characterized Professor Hong’s speech as a 
matter regarding “internal departmental staffing and administration,” 
which constituted unprotected speech.
252
 
These decisions suggest that while the work performed by faculty is 
indeed multifaceted, academic freedom does not protect speech that lacks 
a well-defined academic or scholarly nexus. At best, in cases such as 
Hong, Renken, Gorum, and Abcarian, where faculty are not speaking 
purely within their professorial job responsibilities of teaching and 
scholarship, but are speaking pursuant to administrative or managerial 
functions that they are professionally obligated to perform and that touch 
upon internal administrative and non-academic matters, courts appear 
willing to apply Garcetti and assess the speech as outside the realm of 
academic-freedom protection. From this standpoint, Garcetti can be con-
strued as an extension of Connick granting the public employers wide 
latitude to manage public sector organizations.
253
 
While academic speech that centers on core academic functions is 
likely to enjoy academic-freedom protection, and academic speech loose-
ly connected to core academic functions involving quasi-administrative 
activities is less likely to receive academic-freedom protection under the 
First Amendment in the wake of Garcetti, it is worth noting that certain 
faculty utterances are wholly undeserving of academic-freedom protec-
tion. The Seventh Circuit examined a university’s decision to take action 
regarding a faculty member’s involvement in certain controversial acts of 
expression. In Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College,
254
 a part-time communi-
ty college instructor gave a homosexual student enrolled in her cos-
metology class religious pamphlets that espoused the sinfulness of ho-
mosexuality.
255
 The college admonished the instructor in writing and di-
rected her to cease the behavior, which was considered a violation of the 
college’s sexual harassment policy.256 A year later, the college notified 
                                                                                                                                  
tionally protected, the librarian’s speech that concerned neither scholarship nor teaching was not 
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 718. 
 252. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
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the instructor that she would not be offered a teaching contract to remain 
employed with the institution.
257
 The faculty member brought suit claim-
ing a violation of her free speech rights in addition to other various con-
stitutional violations.
258
 
The faculty member’s case failed, but it provided an opportunity for 
the court to discuss the importance of the Garcetti decision. According to 
the court, Garcetti highlights concern for the importance accorded to 
public-sector employer’s interests.259 The faculty member’s free speech 
concerns were deemed subordinate to the community college’s instruc-
tional objectives because “the college had an interest in ensuring that its 
instructors stay on message . . . .”260 While faculty views on assigned 
course subject matter are indeed protected speech, the instructor’s speech 
in the instant case, verbal and through the religious pamphlets, was not 
related to instructing the students on the course subject matter—
cosmetology.
261
 Hence, the speech was not constitutionally protected, 
and the college was empowered to take remedial measures in response to 
the unprotected speech.
262
 
A tenured mathematics professor at Kansas State University, John 
Heublein, was the subject of complaints from students and fellow faculty 
members regarding alleged sarcastic remarks and discourteous behavior 
in Heublein v. Wefald.
263
 Following an administrative appeal to the prov-
ost and a grievance hearing as provided by the university handbooks, the 
associate dean for academics, defendant David Delker, required that 
Heublein comply with various corrective measures.
264
 In response, Heu-
blein filed a lawsuit alleging due process and free speech violations.
265
 
The free speech claim focused on statements made by Professor 
Heublein in class and outside the classroom. In this case, the court ap-
plied Garcetti only to speech uttered outside the classroom setting be-
cause the Supreme Court left undecided whether the Garcetti standard 
would apply to classroom teaching.
266
 The court dismissed the free 
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speech claim and ruled that Professor Heublein failed to satisfy the Gar-
cetti test.
267
 
Piggee and Heublein offer examples of faculty speech that compel 
college and university administrators to manage their academic work-
force. Because faculty are given unique access to students and a platform 
from which to teach and express scholarly views, when that access is 
abused for non-academic purposes, academic freedom should grant no 
protection to speech that harbors misconduct. 
A view of post-Garcetti jurisprudence suggests that lower courts 
are prepared to determine that academic speech outside of teaching or 
scholarly functions, but within the scope of a faculty member’s profes-
sional duties, may be beyond the protective reach of the First Amend-
ment. However, when the speech at issue is related to scholarship or 
teaching, the Pickering-Connick analytical framework shall remain ap-
plicable to resolve public sector free speech claims. This raises important 
questions about the scope of academic speech and the consequences of 
academic freedom denied to professorial speech in forums outside of 
scholarship and teaching. What are the official duties of a professor em-
ployed at a public university, and what speech offered in the course of 
performing those official job duties is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection? Justice Kennedy warned that certain academic speech may be 
entitled to constitutional protection, but scarce guidance exists regarding 
application of the Garcetti rationale to the public university scholar. Per-
haps a better understanding of the modern day professoriate is necessary. 
IV. PROFESSORIAL OBLIGATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
A disturbing concern generated by the Garcetti decision is that the 
“official duties” analysis could be viewed as diminishing academic-
freedom protections to the extent that faculty are not distinguished from 
the vast ranks of public employees. Whether the work of the college pro-
fessor centers on teaching, research, or service, these activities represent 
the faculty member’s official duties and may constitute unprotected 
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speech, unless Justice Kennedy’s caveat268 affirms fundamental protec-
tion for academic speech. Whether the Supreme Court is prepared to 
carve out a rule that confirms that academic freedom remains a special 
concern of the Constitution that extends First Amendment protection 
post-Garcetti may ultimately depend on a better understanding of the 
American professoriate. 
A noteworthy observation regarding professorial obligations in the 
classroom is revealed in an essay prepared by Professor Leonard V. 
Kaplan from the University of Wisconsin Law School. In 2007, Profes-
sor Kaplan was involved in a controversy surrounding comments raised 
during his legal process class in which he discussed the problems experi-
enced by the Hmong people who immigrated to Wisconsin.
269
 While Pro-
fessor Kaplan’s comments during the class were intended to advance the 
study of legal formalism, some took offense and Professor Kaplan ex-
pressed regret for his statements. However, Professor Kaplan pointed out 
that the controversy ignited by his legal process class unveiled important 
principles regarding the professor’s role and the obligations of educa-
tional institutions. For instance, Professor Kaplan submitted that “[i]t is a 
law school’s obligation to provide an environment in which faculty can 
address and teach students how to assess volatile issues.”270 In the legal 
process class at issue, an attempt was made to examine the inadequacy of 
legal formalism through the trials and tribulations of a new immigrant 
group in an American community. The fact that the intended teachable 
moment became lost in controversy reveals the importance of the profes-
sor’s role. Addressing the professoriate directly, Professor Kaplan of-
fered the following: 
We have an obligation to our students. We best meet that obligation 
by showing legal principles at work in difficult and controversial 
settings. We are all harmed if professors avoid controversial materi-
als in deference to some accepted or imposed correctness or an ap-
prehension that a topic may offend sensitivities. The law inevitably 
must resolve questions that many find offensive. If law professors 
avoid these questions, they no longer teach law. Most of us want se-
curity and to be left alone. Learning to question assumptions and 
values can be painful. But if professors avoid certain issues because 
they might offend someone’s sensitivities, we will cease to be a uni-
versity in all but name . . . . I also think that professors are losing 
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authority, in part by failing to raise these difficult issues. Academic 
literature has been cautioning about what has been called the twi-
light of authority. Law students are in danger of becoming mere 
consumers and not students, law professors of becoming entertain-
ers and not teachers.
271
 
Professor Kaplan’s essay, while offered from the perspective of a 
legal educator, speaks to the duty of the professoriate and how the poten-
tial failure of professors represents nothing less than the university’s de-
mise. 
Also, there is evidence to suggest that the state of the professoriate 
is in decline. In a survey of full-time faculty published by Schuster and 
Finkelstein in 2006, a rising percentage of faculty believed that respect 
for the profession had deteriorated.
272
 The study indicated that 83.9% of 
faculty in 1969 felt free to express relevant views in the classroom as 
compared to only 62.9% in 1998.
273
 Further, there is reason to believe 
that administrators are considered less likely to support academic free-
dom. In 1969, 76.1% of faculty surveyed indicated that academic free-
dom was supported by the administration but in 1997, only 55.3% of 
full-time faculty members surveyed believed academic freedom was 
supported by the administration.
274
 These perspectives may be the out-
growth of various concerns regarding the impact of controversial faculty 
speech. Moreover, in the context of the perceived decline of the Ameri-
can professoriate, Garcetti may signal an uncertain future for academic-
freedom protections. 
A. The Ward Churchill Example: Lessons from the Debacle 
The impact of the Garcetti decision on academic speech may be 
better understood through faculty speech examples that illuminate the 
scope of faculty work. In particular, because Garcetti concerns the legali-
ty of disciplinary action imposed against a public sector employee and 
has unique implications for professorial work at public academic institu-
tions, the decision triggers difficult questions regarding academic speech. 
This may be especially troubling for faculty speech on contentious top-
ics. 
Consider the controversial essay Some People Push Back: On the 
Justice of Roosting Chickens, written by University of Colorado profes-
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sor Ward Churchill shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist at-
tacks. The essay criticizes America’s economic and foreign policies, and 
compares some victims in the World Trade Center attack to “little Eich-
manns” after the Nazi Adolf Eichmann who was responsible for orches-
trating the extermination of European Jews in World War II. 
275
 Specifi-
cally, the essay provides, in part, the following: 
Well, really. Let’s get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were 
civilians of a sort. But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a 
technocratic corps at the very heart of America’s global financial 
empire – the “mighty engine of profit” to which the military dimen-
sion of U.S. policy has always been enslaved—and they did so both 
willingly and knowingly. Recourse to “ignorance”—a derivative, 
after all, of the word “ignore”—counts as less than an excuse 
among this relatively well-educated elite. To the extent that any of 
them were unaware of the costs and consequences to others of what 
they were involved in—and in many cases excelling at—It was be-
cause of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was because 
they were too busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into 
their cell phones, arranging power lunches and stock transactions, 
each of which translated, conveniently out of sight, mind and smell-
ing distance, into the starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there 
was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting 
some penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns 
inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d really be in-
terested in hearing about it.
276
 
In 2005, Professor Churchill’s essay garnered national attention fol-
lowing a decision by Hamilton University to rescind an invitation to Pro-
fessor Churchill to participate on an academic panel.
277
 Several profes-
sors at Hamilton University objected to Professor Churchill’s views, 
which led to increased media attention, and university officials received 
more than 6,000 messages protesting Professor Churchill’s appear-
ance.
278
 Further reaction led the Board of Regents for the University of 
Colorado to call a special meeting wherein the board passed a resolution 
ordering an investigation to determine whether Professor Churchill 
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should be dismissed from his position as a tenured faculty member and 
chair of the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of Colorado, 
Boulder.
279
 
Subsequently, a protracted battle ensued between the University of 
Colorado and Professor Churchill that led to a formal investigation of 
Professor Churchill’s comments related to the September 11th attacks.280 
Following a lengthy investigation, the University of Colorado Board of 
Regents decided to terminate Professor Churchill from his tenured posi-
tion for cause, asserting that he engaged in research misconduct includ-
ing plagiarism, fabrication, and falsification.
281
 Professor Churchill im-
mediately sued the university for wrongful discharge and sought rein-
statement.
282
 
Professor Churchill’s alleged acts of research misconduct may have 
been a compelling issue for the University of Colorado, but his speech 
that compared the 9/11 victims to the Nazis is what drew public criticism 
to Professor Churchill. Was Professor Churchill’s speech within the 
scope of his “official job duties?” To the extent that Professor Church-
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ill’s speech focused on his view of U.S. economic and foreign policy, the 
answer would be yes, but whether Garcetti would impose disciplinary 
action is uncertain. The matter may hinge on the link between the speech 
and Professor Churchill’s academic scholarship or teaching. Without an 
adequate academic foundation, academic freedom should provide no 
sanctuary for unchecked faculty speech, and Garcetti may authorize ad-
ministrative action for such unprotected speech. But knowing what is and 
what is not entitled to academic-freedom protection may be difficult for 
faculty to determine. Academics may become reluctant to speak publicly 
at conferences or symposiums on any topic, fearing reprisals for speech 
that fails to fall within Justice Kennedy’s caveat cited in Garcetti. There-
fore, Garcetti can be viewed as a wake-up call for academics and institu-
tions to clarify their support for academic freedom and define the um-
brella of protection available to faculty. 
Applying the post-Garcetti case law to circumstances such as those 
found in the Churchill matter, it is likely that the analysis utilized in Ad-
ams would be most relevant. In Adams, the court determined that a pro-
fessor’s writings in books and commentaries constituted protected speech 
in spite of its conservative tone on political and social issues.
283
 Church-
ill’s essay that criticized American economic and foreign policy might be 
considered core academic speech subject to scrutiny pursuant to Picker-
ing balancing; however, it should be observed that Churchill’s scathing 
reference to the 9/11 victims as “little Eichmanns” could so undermine 
the university’s teaching mission that it is undeserving of First Amend-
ment protection because it is outside the realm of academic discourse. 
From this standpoint, Garcetti would be applicable. Under either ap-
proach, specific clarification regarding the scope of academic-freedom 
protection relative to teaching and scholarship would be beneficial to 
lower courts.  
B. The John Yoo Example: The Faculty Voice and Its Range 
Recall that in Sweezy, the Supreme Court noted that 
“[t]eachers . . . must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evalu-
ate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization 
will stagnate and die.”284 Academics and professors at American univer-
sities are typically offered a broad set of parameters for teaching and 
scholarly purposes, and dread the consequences that might flow from any 
real or perceived bar on individual faculty academic freedom. At the 
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University of California Law School, Professor John Yoo took a leave of 
absence after earning tenure in 1999 to serve as a government lawyer in 
the Department of Justice in the Bush Administration.
285
 While it is pos-
sible that Professor Yoo joined the Department of Justice to gain new 
maturity and understanding about the practice of law to enhance his 
skills and knowledge as a legal educator, he may be best known for the 
role he played in justifying the Bush Administration’s policy in the War 
on Terrorism. 
Professor Yoo is credited for writing a 2002 interrogation opinion 
known as the Torture Memos.
286
 The memos advised the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the President on the use 
of mental and physical torment and coercion to obtain information. The 
methods included prolonged sleep deprivation, binding in stress posi-
tions, and water-boarding. While these acts are widely regarded as tor-
ture in the international community, the Torture Memos claimed that 
these activities might be legally permissible under an expansive interpre-
tation of the Presidential authority during the War on Terrorism. Yoo 
further argued that the President was not bound by the War Crimes 
Act,
287
 thereby providing a legal opinion backing the Bush Administra-
tion’s warrantless wiretapping programs 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as U.S. Navy General 
Counsel Alberta Mora, argued that Professor Yoo’s views were extremist 
and represented “catastrophically poor legal reasoning,” criticizing Pro-
fessor Yoo’s arguments as a violation of the Geneva Convention.288 Also, 
once the Torture Memos became public in 2004, they were repudiated by 
conservatives such as Jack Goldsmith, the head of the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), a division within the Department of Justice responsible 
for advising the President on the limits of executive powers.
289
 Although 
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the Bush Administration initially relied upon the Torture Memos, the 
election of Barack Obama resulted in the new administration’s decision 
to immediately rescind all the OLC’s guidance on interrogation and sur-
veillance policy.
290
 
Since leaving the Department of Justice, Professor Yoo has been 
subject to extensive questions and scrutiny regarding the Torture Memos. 
In 2009, Professor Yoo was called to testify before the House Judiciary 
Committee about his work at the Justice Department.
291
 Furthermore, the 
Justice Department ethics unit, the Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR), initiated an investigation into Professor Yoo’s role in developing 
a legal justification for water-boarding and other harsh interrogation 
methods.
292
 Some media reports indicated that the OPR investigation 
would determine that Professor Yoo engaged in intentional miscon-
duct.
293
 However, the final report determined that Professor Yoo and oth-
ers merely exercised poor judgment.
294
 
Also, a debate ensued at the University of California as to whether 
disciplinary action should be taken against Professor Yoo for his role in 
the Torture Memos. Some believe that academic freedom should be used 
as a shield to those engaged in unethical activities and professional mis-
conduct. On the other hand, universities are not equipped to respond to 
the wide array of outside ventures that result in public complaints about a 
controversial professor. As a general proposition, Professor Yoo’s leave 
of absence to join the Justice Department enhanced his ability in the 
classroom and as a scholar upon his return to the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley law school.
295
 Institutional support for externships, sabbati-
cals, or professional leave is routinely granted to faculty for academic 
purposes. As such, Professor Yoo’s work on the Torture Memos while at 
the Justice Department may well be within the reach of academic-
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freedom protection if the academic leave was indeed granted to influence 
his teaching and scholarship. 
To the extent that Professor Yoo enjoyed academic freedom before 
his leave of absence, it is difficult to pinpoint at what point he ceased to 
have academic-freedom protection once joining the Justice Department. 
In sum, Professor Yoo’s situation provides a wonderful example of how 
professorial work differs in complexity and scope from other public sec-
tor jobs (e.g., city manager, police officer, tax assessor, etc.). Moreover, 
given that Professor Yoo was not convicted of any illegal activity, aca-
demic freedom is difficult to deny. To do so would likely discourage 
faculty from gaining new insight and perspective that can be attained 
through external outreach and ventures outside the college campus. 
In cases such as Renken and Abcarian, academic freedom was una-
vailable to the faculty members because their speech involved official 
duties of a managerial nature—administrating a National Science Foun-
dation grant and management of a medical college, respectively. Also, an 
initial survey of Professor Yoo’s case might indicate that academic-
freedom protection is improper because his work at the Justice Depart-
ment was not an academic matter but rather the official duties of a pro-
fessional government lawyer. However, professors take leave from their 
on-campus academic work frequently to gain practical experience to 
augment their scholarship and classroom teaching. In this context, Gar-
cetti would not appear to apply. 
Faculty speech that triggers an emotional response, such as Profes-
sor Churchill’s reference to September 11th victims as “little Eich-
manns,” or speech that may be criticized as politically partisan and ill-
founded, such as Professor Yoo’s Torture Memos, present a tempting 
opportunity for college and university administrators to impose discipli-
nary actions or sanction faculty for this type of speech. But academics 
must be allowed the latitude to express themselves on matters that are 
perhaps controversial. Of course, speech that creates a hostile work envi-
ronment—gender or racial slurs, profanity, etc.—or speech that unduly 
interferes with the operations of the institution ought not receive academ-
ic-freedom protection. Unfortunately, Garcetti does not clearly distin-
guish faculty from other public employees, although it offers an optimis-
tic view that speech regarding classroom instruction and scholarship 
might be entitled to constitutional protection. 
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V. A CONCEPTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM GOING FORWARD 
A. The Value of the Garcetti Caveat 
At the close of the Garcetti majority opinion, Justice Kennedy 
states that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional 
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary em-
ployee-speech jurisprudence.”296 While somewhat vague, this caveat ap-
pears to signal that academic freedom, as a constitutional protection, may 
be sustainable for faculty at public colleges and universities. Lower 
courts seem to agree, however, that the Garcetti caveat leaves various 
questions regarding academic freedom unsettled that will require sub-
stantial consideration from the courts going forward. 
For instance, the Garcetti caveat indicates that speech regarding 
scholarship and teaching may be entitled to constitutional protection but 
is silent as to speech related to university governance and public service. 
Confining academic-freedom protection to expression related to scholar-
ship and classroom teaching arguably may be too narrow to adequately 
protect the legitimate role faculty should play in the higher education 
community. Also, the Garcetti caveat leaves uncertain under what cir-
cumstances the majority’s “official duties” analysis applies to academic 
speech, and some courts have shared this concern and been reluctant to 
apply Garcetti.
297
 Thus, future decisions relying on Garcetti regarding 
the breadth of academic-freedom protection, especially in matters that do 
not exclusively involve teaching or scholarship, may be significantly in-
consistent.
298
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B. Academic Freedom and Professorial Responsibility 
In recent years, Garcetti’s impact on higher education has been ex-
amined relative to institutional governance, as well as the decision’s in-
fluence on the general meaning and strength of academic freedom.
299
 
While academic freedom may have been best served by the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s admonition that academic freedom is a special concern of 
the First Amendment, Garcetti, at the very least, has given many pause 
to wonder about the future of academic freedom. Certainly, there are 
those who believe that academic freedom provides nothing but a cloak or 
pretext that allows faculty to use their academic position as a platform to 
engage in mischief by expressing themselves on matters that have no 
academic foundation. 
Consider the March 2011 open records request by the Wisconsin 
Republican Party’s Deputy Executive Director Stephen Thompson for 
email records of University of Wisconsin Professor Bill Cronon.
300
 The 
GOP’s request for Professor Cronon’s email records was made while the 
state of Wisconsin was receiving national and international media atten-
tion over an ongoing budget controversy that placed the state’s Republi-
can governor at odds with Democrats in the legislature. Finding the Re-
publican Party’s open records request authorized by state law, University 
of Wisconsin at Madison Chancellor Biddy Martin indicated that “the 
university would comply with the law and . . . apply the kind of balanc-
ing test that the law allows, taking such things as right to privacy and 
free expression into account.”301 In complying with the open records re-
quest, the university withheld certain materials in the interests of aca-
demic freedom as announced by Chancellor Martin: 
We are . . . excluding what we consider to be the private email ex-
changes among scholars that fall within the orbit of academic free-
dom and all that is entailed by it. Academic freedom is the freedom 
to pursue knowledge and develop lines of argument without fear of 
reprisal for controversial findings and without the premature disclo-
sure of those ideas. 
Scholars and scientists pursue knowledge by way of open intellec-
tual exchange. Without a zone of privacy within which to conduct 
and protect their work, scholars would not be able to produce new 
knowledge or make life-enhancing discoveries. Lively, even heated 
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and acrimonious debates over policy, campus and otherwise, as well 
as more narrowly defined disciplinary matters are essential elements 
of an intellectual environment and such debates are the very defini-
tion of the Wisconsin Idea. 
When faculty members use email or any other medium to develop 
and share their thoughts with one another, they must be able to as-
sume a right to the privacy of those exchanges, barring violations of 
state law or university policy. Having every exchange of ideas sub-
ject to public exposure puts academic freedom in peril and threatens 
the processes by which knowledge is created. The consequence for 
our state will be the loss of the most talented and creative faculty 
who will choose to leave for universities where collegial exchange 
and the development of ideas can be undertaken without fear of 
premature exposure or reprisal for unpopular positions. 
This does not mean that scholars can be irresponsible in the use of 
state and university resources or the exercise of academic freedom. 
To our faculty, I say: Continue to ask difficult questions, explore 
unpopular lines of thought and exercise your academic freedom, re-
gardless of your point of view. As always, we will take our cue 
from the bronze plaque on the walls of Bascom Hall. It calls for the 
“continual and fearless sifting and winnowing” of ideas. It is our 
tradition, our defining value, and the way to a better society.
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Although Chancellor Martin’s message represents the University of 
Wisconsin, it is likely embraced at colleges and universities throughout 
the nation. 
Besides the endorsement for academic freedom, Martin’s message 
rejects the irresponsible exercise of academic freedom or the pursuit of 
unpopular lines of thought that have no linkage to scholarly exploration. 
Academic freedom is not free and all speech is not protected. Professors 
and academics are granted an expanded level of freedom as part of their 
employment, but that freedom is accompanied by a heightened level of 
trust and duty. When that trust and duty are breached, no academic-
freedom protection is available. But how to evaluate the breach of that 
trust/duty covenant is the challenge. 
At Northwestern University, Professor John Michael Bailey invited 
students in his human sexuality course to observe a live in-class sex 
demonstration. He was initially supported by university officials, who 
said “[t]he university supports the efforts of its faculty to further the ad-
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vancement of knowledge.”303 Further, a university spokesperson indicat-
ed that “Northwestern University faculty members engage in teaching 
and research on a wide variety of topics, some of them controversial.”304 
As news spread that about 100 students actually watched a man penetrate 
a woman with an electric-powered device, the university was compelled 
to explain its dismay with the incident and directed a full investigation.
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Reacting to the professor’s decision to permit the in-class sex 
demonstration, Northwestern University President Morton Schapiro stat-
ed, “I feel it represented extremely poor judgment on the part of our fac-
ulty member . . . . I simply do not believe this was appropriate, necessary 
or in keeping with Northwestern University’s academic mission.”306 
President Schapiro’s comments, like those of Chancellor Martin’s, 
strike at the core professorial function—advancing the university’s aca-
demic mission without abandoning the institution’s responsibility to em-
brace ethical and professional standards. The University of Wisconsin 
was prepared to withhold information in the interest of protecting materi-
als that, if disclosed, would place academic freedom in peril. Northwest-
ern University may refuse to recognize academic freedom as a shield to 
insulate a professor from disciplinary action because the professor al-
lowed expression that arguably did not constitute an appropriate academ-
ic pursuit. 
Given the complex array of circumstances that frequently raise aca-
demic freedom concerns, Garcetti gingerly confirms that professorial 
speech regarding teaching and scholarship remains protected. Beyond 
that consideration, faculty speech regarding administrative matters or 
quasi-administrative matters is less likely to receive protection. Without 
question, a burden is placed on individual faculty to police themselves, 
especially when their speech lacks a firm academic foundation. 
While more guidance is welcome from the Supreme Court regard-
ing what academic speech is constitutionally protected and to what ex-
tent, American higher education would also be well served by taking the 
initiative and defining individual academic freedom for itself. If these 
primary stakeholders are unable define academic freedom in some mean-
ingful fashion, perhaps the courts will continue address academic free-
dom in bits, pieces, and caveats. Again, Garcetti and the post-Garcetti 
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cases should serve notice that the scope of individual academic freedom 
requires renewed clarification, which will only benefit the American 
higher education system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While colleges and universities are complex organizations that de-
pend on contributions from various skilled and dedicated professionals, 
the academic faculty plays a vital role in the mission of any higher edu-
cation institution. Professors rely on academic freedom to pursue their 
work without the threat of retaliatory disciplinary action influencing their 
teaching or research. The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti raises 
important questions regarding free speech and the scope of academic-
freedom protection. The post-Garcetti case law appears to unveil a dis-
tinction as to speech that centers on core academic matters, such as 
teaching and scholarship, verses speech that involves administrative and 
managerial concerns. Although academic freedom has been characterized 
as a difficult concept to define, Garcetti has provided an opportunity for 
the judiciary, as well as institutions of higher education, to re-examine 
academic freedom and the protections available to individual professors 
and faculty members. 
 
